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ABSTRACT 
In its report titled "Organizational Culture: Use of Training to Help Change DOD 
Inventory Management Culture," (GAO/NSIAD-94-193) (1994), the Government 
Accounting Office asserts that the Department of Defense would be able to reduce its 
inventory of secondary items and develop a culture of economic and efficient inventory 
management if Department of Defense inventory management personnel were trained in 
modem logistics practices. In contrast, this thesis presents the position that high 
inventory levels are the result of performance measures and reward systems that 
encourage holding high levels of inventory. Included is a description of performance 
measures used for Item Managers, Inventory Managers and unit commanders along with 
a discussion of an employee motivation model and other systemic factors that impact 
inventory levels. This thesis suggests the addition of Inventory Turnover and Total 
Costing to the performance appraisals of those within the Department of Defense's 
supply systems, and a separation of readiness criteria into supply-related and non-supply-
related issues for unit commanders' performance appraisals as means to promote lower 
on-hand secondary inventories while continuing to meet the demand for those items. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the past twenty years, there has been a revolution in inventory management 
practices in the private sector. A shift in the way businesses view inventory and its 
relationship to firm profitability has birthed a new set of performance measures and 
rewards focused on inventory reduction. Some results of this paradigm shift are: 
drastically reduced on-hand inventories, improved distribution systems, higher quality 
products and services, and healthier bottom lines for businesses who successfully make 
the shift. Meanwhile, military inventory management practices have remained largely 
the same. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is in an era of continuous budget reductions. 
As the largest single portion of the discretionary federal budget, DoD is a prime target for 
budget cuts. Procurement scandals in the media exacerbated the situation and have 
placed DoD under a public and media microscope, resulting in Congressional inquiries 
and United States General Accounting Office (GAO) audits. Some of these have 
identified excess inventory within the military as a significant problem. However, over 
the last ten years the Department of Defense has been moving slowly toward a more 
efficient inventory management system. Why has DoD lagged behind the commercial 
sector in this area? There are many reasons and most of them are interrelated, making 
any change a lengthy and complex undertaking. A GAO report titled "Organizational 
Culture: Use of Training to Help Change DOD Inventory Management Culture," 
(GAO/NSIAD-94-193), dated August, 1994, asserts that DoD's training in modem 
logistics practices is lacking and that, once accomplished, DoD's Inventory and Item 
Managers will have the tools they need to bring DoD up to par with commercial 
businesses. This report states that training in modem logistics practices will "foster the 
desired change" in the current culture (GAO/NSIAD-94-193; pp. 2-3). 
In the author's opinion the GAO's assertion that training in modem logistics 
practices will reduce excess inventory is only partially correct. Standardized training in 
modem logistics practices for all supply and logistics personnel, exposing them to just-in-
time inventory methods, direct vendor delivery, total asset visibility concepts and 
sophisticated economic order quantity models would be beneficial. However, training 
alone will not reduce inventory levels. High inventory levels are the result of 
performance measures and a reward system that values holding these high levels of 
inventory. There are other systemic features which also can have significant impacts on 
inventory management practices, however, this thesis does not address these in depth. 
An analysis of the behaviors of managers within DoD's inventory system and the 
performance measures and rewards that propagate these behaviors can explain to a 
greater degree why the military has not kept pace with the private sector in inventory 
reduction. 
2 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the management of secondary items, an 
inventory category comprised of repair parts, replacement parts, clothing, subsistence 
items, medical supplies, and consumables such as fuel. 
First, this thesis provides a simple overview of DoD's supply systems, then looks 
at its current performance measures and rewards systems in order to identify those 
aspects of these systems that promote carrying inventory in excess of demand. This 
thesis then discusses a model of employee performance and develops performance 
measures which may have the greatest impact in lowering inventory levels in DoD. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the question "What areas within the current DoD 
performance measure and reward structure need to change, and how, in order to 
accomplish inventory reductions?" In order to effectively answer this question, other 
questions must fir~t be answered. First, how are Item and Inventory Managers' 
performance currently measured and rewarded? Next, do the current performance 
criteria and reward systems impact inventory levels? And if so, do they explain high 
levels of DoD inventory, and if so, what must performance measures be in order to 
motivate behaviors that result in inventory reductions? Then, what are the impediments 
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which keep these changes from occurring? The final question to be addressed is, given 
the above information, How can these changes be implemented within DoD? 
D. RESEARCH METHODS 
Information for this thesis was obtained from several sources. The information 
used to benchmark DoD's current performance measures and rewards systems was 
obtained through on-site semi-structured interviews with: 
1) Office of the Joint Staff(J4) (Logistics) and key staff members, Pentagon, 
Washington, DC; 
2) Chief, Supply Procedures and System Modernization, Air Combat Logistics 
Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; 
3) Two Item Managers, two Supply Systems Analysts, the Chief of the Weapons 
Systems Division, Deputy Chief-of-Staff (Combat Development), and two 
members of the Comptroller's department at Defense General Supply Center, 
Richmond, Virginia; 
4) Five Inventory Managers at US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. 
Monroe, Virginia, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, and Defense 
Depot, Norfolk, Virginia. 
The basic questions asked during the interviews are listed in the Appendix. Additional 
questions were asked where needed to clarify responses. Further information was 
obtained through unstructured discussions with five Army, Navy and Marine Corps 
supply officers assigned for duty at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
Several GAO reports pertaining to inventory management also were reviewed for 
applicability. 
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E. ORGANIZATION 
There are five remaining chapters. Chapter II describes the administrative flow of 
the federal supply system, discusses the performance measures used for Item and 
Inventory Managers, and the behavioral impact of these measures on DoD inventory. 
Chapter ill describes a model of employee motivation examining how motivation, 
performance measures and organizational goals are inextricably linked. Chapter III also 
suggests additional performance measures which could result in behaviors that reduce 
inventory levels. Chapter IV discuses factors internal and external to DoD that impede 
change. Chapter V looks at ways of implementing different performance measures and 
rewards while taking into account the limitations identified in Chapter IV. Chapter VI 
contains a summary of the thesis and conclusions. 
5 
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II. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THEIR IMP ACT ON DOD 
INVENTORY 
The supply system currently in use in DoD evolved over many years and is 
designed to support high levels of combat readiness. The performance criteria against 
which personnel in the supply system are measured have not changed to reflect the recent 
emphasis on efficiency through lower operating costs and less capital investment in 
inventory. 
This chapter first provides an overview of the inventory and supply systems used 
in DoD, including the Defense Logistics Agency, General Services Administration and 
each of the four branches of the Armed Forces. Following this is a discussion of the 
performance criteria against which Item Managers, Inventory Managers and unit 
Commanding Officers, or "users," are measured. This chapter is intended to serve as a 
benchmark from which to improve the way performance is measured with the goal of 
increasing the efficiency with which the supply system operates. 
A. THE WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SUPPLY CONCEPT 
Just as the private sector supply system is divided into retail and wholesale levels, 
so too is the DoD supply system. Although the specific supply system used by each 
branch of the Armed Forces is constructed differently, the Army, Navy and Marine Corps 
use both wholesale and retail stock points. The Air Force uses only wholesale. The 
federal government's wholesale stock system is comprised of five organizations: the 
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General Services Administration, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the service-
specific wholesale stock points managed by the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively. 
Item Managers are located at wholesale-level activities. An Item Manager is 
assigned for each and every National Stock Number (NSN) item that a wholesale activity 
controls. Item Managers are typically assigned the control of many different items. The 
Item Manager is responsible for procuring the item, selecting the stocking location, 
tracking the item's demand history, and arranging transportation of the item from the 
depot to the user. They also are encouraged to arrange for direct vendor delivery 
whenever possible in order to reduce warehousing costs to the government. An 
individual Item Manager may be responsible for a few highly complex items or many 
simpler items. (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
Inventory Managers are located at retail-level activities. An Inventory Manager is 
responsible for managing all materials stored in a facility, regardless of the NSN, much 
the same as occurs in a civilian retail store. High demand items are located at the retail 
level as well as at the wholesale level to support the. needs of the user. 
B. SUPPLY SYSTEMS 
1. Defense Logistics Agency 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the DoD wholesale distributor for 
logistics materials used in common by the service branches (Smith, 1996). 
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There are nine categories of items that DLA does not control: 
1) Major end items (e.g., ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.); 
2) Depot level repairable parts; 
3) Items which are used exclusively by one service branch; 
4) Non-ordinance nuclear items; 
5) Items that have been waivered; 
6) Reclaimed by a service; 
7) Weapons systems being held for foreign military sales; 
8) Weapons systems program items which are not design stable or are in pre-
production testing; and 
9) Modification/alteration kits for a current weapons system. 
Logistics items (such as tools, general repair parts, sub-assemblies, etc.) not meeting one 
or more of these criteria are controlled by DLA. 
DLA is organized in three tiers located across the country: 
1) Headquarters in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; 
2) Defense General Supply Centers (where the Item Managers are located); and 
3) Defense Distribution Centers (where the stock is actually held). 
DLA is a Defense Business Operating Fund activity, meaning that it does not receive 
annual appropriations from Congress, but adds a surcharge to the cost of the items sold. 
The purpose of the surcharge is to just cover DLA's general, administration and operating 
costs each year. 
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2. General Services Administration 
The General Services Administration (GSA) serves as a wholesale supplier to all 
federal agencies, including DoD. GSA is fully self-supporting and offers such 
commodities as general office supplies (from pens and pencils to large furniture items), 
leased space for government and DoD offices, as well as leases for many types of 
industrial and non-industrial vehicles and tools. GSA does not handle logistics items, so 
there is minimal overlap with DLA inventories. 
3. U.S. Army 
The Army separates its equipment and related items into nine classifications. The 
unit or command relying on the supply system for secondary item support (i.e., combat 
units) is referred to as the "User" in Figure 2.1 and subsequent figures. The user must 
determine if the item to be procured is in the national stock system (it has an NSN). If so, 
the user requests the material required from the Army retail activity responsible for the 
item. If not, then the user obtains permission to order the item through a commercial 
vendor. 
The arrows in Figure 2.1 and subsequent figures in this chapter represent the 
administrative path of item requisitions. The physical flow of the item is the reverse, 
unless otherwise specified. As shown in Figure 2.1, for items that are repairable, the user 
places his requisition with the Direct Support/General Service Maintenance Activity 
(DS/GS), turning in the broken part at the same time. For all other classes of material 
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except medical supplies, the user's requisition goes to the Material Management Center 
(MMC) to be filled. The MMC fills the request from stock on hand or orders the item 
from the appropriate wholesale activity. 
The DS/GS also orders through the MM:C to replenish their stock of repair parts. 
The wholesale activities used by the Army are GSA, DLA and the Army Material 
Command. The Army Material Command manages those Army-specific items identified 
as not DLA controlled. (Steiner, 1996) 
GENERAL 
SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION 
DIRECT SUPPORT/ 
GENERAL SERVICE 
MAINTENANCE 
ACCOUNT 
USER 
DEFENSE 
LOGISTICS 
AGENCY 
I 
MATERIAL 
MANAGEMENT 
CENTER 
Figure 2.1 Army Supply System's Administrative Item Requisition Path 
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4. U.S. Navy 
The Navy separates its materials into "cognizance codes" based upon the 
wholesale activity that controls the item. Local purchases are authorized only when an 
NSN item does not exist or is not available to fill the request in time for deployment. 
After determining that the desired item is in the NSN system, the user places the 
requisition with the local Supply Response Section (SRS) at the ship or Naval Station 
level. The SRS holds some stock of high demand items and fills the requisition from 
stock on hand if it is available. If the stock is not available, the requisition is forwarded 
to the Document Control Unit (DCU). The DCU is an expediting activity only and holds 
no stock. The DCU determines which wholesale activity controls the requested item and 
places the order with that activity, as depicted in Figure 2.2. The SRS and DCU are both 
part of the user activity's supply department. 
If the user is deployed, the DCU sends the requisition to the Retail Stock section 
of the tender or aircraft carrier's (when part of a battlegroup) supply department to be 
filled. If the user is not deployed, the request goes to the Fleet Industrial Support Center 
(FISC) to be filled. The FISC is a warehouse holding inventory belonging to DLA and 
the Navy Inventory Control Point (NA VICP), signified by the arrows from these two 
organizations to the FISC. The NA VICP manages the Navy-specific items identified as 
not under DLA's control. (Park, 1996; Randle, 1996) 
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Figure 2.2 Navy Supply System's Administrative Item Requisition Path 
5. U.S. Air Force 
The Air Force no longer uses a retail level of supply, as shown in Figure 2.3. The 
user is required to do all the research necessary to locate the desired item within the NSN 
system. If an appropriate NSN does not exist, a local purchase is authorized for the item. 
Otherwise the user forwards the requisition directly to the wholesale level who controls 
that item, either DLA, GSA or an Air Logistics Center (ALC). The ALC manages those 
Air Force - specific items identified as not DLA controlled. (Benson, 1996) 
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GENERAL 
SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION 
LOCAL 
PURCHASE 
DEFENSE 
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AIR 
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CENTER 
Figure 2.3 Air Force Supply System's Administrative Item Requisition Path 
6. U.S. Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps separates its material into three supply account codes based 
upon the cost of the item. Local purchases of items are authorized only when the 
requested item is not in the NSN system. When a needed item does hold an NSN, the 
user places his request with the local supply unit, as shown in Figure 2.4, which carries 
only minimal inexpensive, high demand items (pens, paper, light bulbs, etc.) for issue. 
If base supply does not have the item, the requisition is forwarded to the 
Supported Activity Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU) located on the 
base. The SMU fills requisitions from stock on hand. If the SMU does not have the 
item, the request is forwarded to the appropriate wholesale activity, GSA, DLA or the 
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB). The MCLB manages those Marine Corps-
specific items identified as not under DLA's control (Brownfield and Santy, 1996). 
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Figure 2.4 Marine Corps Supply System's Administrative Requisition Path 
C. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR ITEM MANAGERS, INVENTORY 
MANAGERS AND USERS 
1. Item Managers 
Item Managers are located at the wholesale level of the federal supply system. 
GSA, DLA and each branch of the armed forces has Item Managers for the items they 
manage at the wholesale level. 
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a. Performance Measures 
Item managers interviewed for this study at wholesale activities indicated 
the primary performance measure criterion was the Item Manager's order fill rate (Nixon 
and Wolfe, 1996). The order fill rate is determined simply by dividing the number of 
orders filled by the total number of orders received. The second most common 
measurement is backorder age: how long an item has been on backorder, waiting to be 
filled, from the time the requisition is received. 
Other criteria cited include: 
1) Number of orders shipped; 
2) Number of pounds shipped; and a 
3) Ratio of the amount of warehouse space used per item divided by that 
item's turnover rate. 
Item Managers indicated that the order fill rate and backorder age are the most important 
factors for performance appraisals. The other measurement criteria mentioned are 
secondary elements. 
b. Impact on Inventory Levels 
The results of using the performance measures listed above do not 
contribute to lowering inventory levels. To the contrary, the order fill rate criterion 
promotes keeping high inventories on hand to support as high an order fill rate as 
possible for that Item Manager (Benson, 1996; Coulombe, 1996; Nixon and Wolfe, 
1996). The high order fill rates result in high performance appraisal ratings on this 
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criterion for the Item Manager, possibly qualifying him or her for an aimual performance 
award. 
The second criterion, backorder age, results in Item Managers canceling 
an order as soon as they determine that they are unable to fill the requisition quickly. 
This keeps the Item Manager's backorder ages low, supporting high performance 
appraisal ratings for this performance criterion. Lengthy backorder ages occur most 
frequently as a result of lack of availability from the manufacturer and long lead times, 
both of which are outside the Item Managers' control (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996). The 
other criteria mentioned result in behaviors such as: 
1) Shipping many small orders, while delaying the shipment of large orders; 
2) Splitting large orders to increase the number of orders shipped; or 
3) Shipping large or heavy items first, postponing small or lightweight 
shipments in order to increase the total pounds of material shipped. 
The reason these behaviors occur is that they increase the value of the criterion being 
assessed, which has positive results on the Item Manager's performance appraisal. For 
example, an Item Manager who ships 24 small orders receives a higher performance 
appraisal mark for "Number of Orders Shipped" than an Item Manager who ships only 17 
orders. An Item Manager who ships an air conditioning unit weighing several hundred 
pounds receives a higher performance appraisal mark for "Number of Pounds Shipped" 
than an Item Manager who ships pens and pencils weighing a few ounces. 
Although the Item Managers interviewed did not indicate that the ratio of 
how much warehouse space an item uses divided by the item turnover rate results in any 
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directly attributable behavior, it can negatively affect the morale of Itein Managers 
assigned large, low demand inventory items, because it is a performance criterion "hit" 
over which they have no control (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996; Benson, 1996). DLA has 
specifically attempted to ensure that the assignment of these items was evenly 
distributed - that no Item Manager was assigned a disproportionate share of this type of 
item (Smith, 1996). 
2. Inventory Managers 
Inventory Managers are located at the retail level of each service branch's supply 
system. Any supply activity occurring below the wholesale level is considered retail. 
a. Performance Measures 
The performance measures for Inventory Managers are very similar to 
those ofltem Managers, in that the primary focus is on material availability. Order fill 
rates and backorder ages are the primary criteria used to evaluate supply personnel at the 
retail level. Inventory Managers want material at the retail stock point or quickly 
obtainable when a request arrives. This will enable them to keep order fill rates high and 
backorder ages low. (Benson, 1996; Park, 1996; Brownfield and Santy, 1996; Smith, 
1996; Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
Every military organizational element has a list of all the equipment, spare 
parts, clothing and food items the unit and its subordinates, including non-combat 
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elements, must have in order to be combat ready. Each branch of service has a different 
term for this list, so this thesis uses the phrase "requirements objective" (RO) for the sake 
of simplicity. Inventory Managers carry those items their customers require to meet their 
RO. At the retail level, maximum and minimum stock levels for each item carried are in 
place and enforced, with the exception of the Navy, which sets only minimum levels. 
One resource that Inventory Managers have that is not available to Item 
Managers is the "backdoor supply chain." This refers to the Inventory Managers' ability 
to contact each other when attempting to locate a requisitioned item not in their stock at 
the time. This is especially true for units deploying on short notice, which are unable to 
wait for an order to arrive from a wholesale activity. One Inventory Manager will 
arrange to fill his or her RO from another Inventory Manager's stock, then redirect the 
material he or she has on order to replenish the stock of the Inventory Manager who 
helped him or her. 
b. Impact on Inventory Levels 
There is an incredible amount of pressure on the retail level of supply 
from operational unit commanders to be able to fill every requisition as soon as it arrives. 
The ability of the retail level to fill orders quickly has a direct impact on the readiness of 
combat units, the availability of the equipment the units use and the service branches' 
ability to support the service members. The consequences of inadequate logistics support 
can be significant, most notably mission failure and the loss of American lives. 
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This emphasis motivates Inventory Managers to carry as close to their 
maximum stock levels as possible of as many items as possible. There is also a great 
temptation to try to carry small amounts of additional inventories of those items that the 
Inventory Manager, and the unit commander(s) he or she serves, believes may be needed 
beyond the RO level. 
3. Users 
By "users" is meant any command or unit who relies on the supply system for 
secondary item support. These include staff and administrative and medical support 
units as well as combat units. 
a. Performance Measures 
Commanders of combat units are evaluated based upon their readiness for 
battle. Readiness for battle is determined by criteria such as: 
1) Are their aircraft fully mission capable? 
2) Do their troops have all required equipment? 
3) Is the equipment in good condition? 
4) Are the weapons' systems fully operational and mission capable? 
When equipment is unavailable for service, the user wants it back in 
service right away. The user is inadvertently penalized when the wholesale activity is 
unable to procure the required part. The expectations of the user's superiors and peers is 
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that operational availability will be at or above what is minimally required (anywhere 
from 85% to 99%, depending upon the element reviewed). The user has the added 
pressure of being evaluated in relation to his peers' readiness levels. 
b. Impact on Inventory Levels 
Combat commanders have a very difficult job. Ultimately, they must lead 
others into battle knowing that the lives of those they lead are highly dependent upon the 
quality and availability of the equipment, gear and logistics elements that go with them. 
Holding less than 100% of the RO for any item is a situation that needs to be corrected. 
Users will hold the highest inventories possible, up to and over what the RO allows. Due 
to the impact of a lower than average or allowed operational availability in terms of 
performance appraisals from superiors and standing with peers, users petition their chain 
of command to increase the unit's RO on items the user believes it to be inadequate. 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, the current DoD supply structure was designed to provide the 
highest levels of readiness for combat units and their support elements. This system was 
not designed to promote low inventory levels, and until recently inventory levels were not 
a major concern. 
Since the mid-1980's organizations such as the GAO have conducted numerous 
studies into the inventory management practices of DoD. These studies cover topics 
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including: warehousing (GAO/NSIAD-95-64), cost savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156), 
growth in parts inventories (GAO/NSIAD-90-1 00; GAO/NSIAD-90-111 ), changes in 
overall inventory (GAO/NSIAD-94-235), reengineering and best practices (GAO/NSIAD-
94-64; GAO/NSIAD-96-5), and changing beliefs, values and cultures (GAO/NSIAD-92-
105; GAO/NSIAD-94-193) to name a few. Some studies have compared DoD to 
prominent private sector businesses recognized as having highly effective inventory 
management systems such as Motorola, 3M, DuPont, Federal Express, et al. 
(GAO/NSIAD 92-105) and British Airways (GAO/NSIAD 96-156). 
One requirement of a highly effective management system (inventory or 
otherwise) is using performance measures that directly support the organization's 
mission. DoD's mission has been to have a highly mobile military force, capable of 
deploying on a moment's notice. The current supply system attempts to support that 
mission. Now, efficiency and effectiveness are required by the public. However, if the 
performance measures of Item Managers, Inventory Managers and users are not changed 
to include efficiency considerations as well as readiness, their behaviors will not change 
and inventory levels will not be lowered. 
The question then becomes, "What performance measures are needed to motivate 
these three groups of people to reduce their inventory levels?" That is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
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Ill. PERFORMANCE MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE 
INVENTORY 
An organization's performance results from the performance of each individual in 
the organization. For an organization to achieve a specific performance goal, the 
performance criteria against which employees are measured must be related directly to 
the desired goal. Each employee then must function at or abov~ a specified level of 
~rformance for each criterion set by the organization, and they must be rewarded for 
doing so. In order to develop performance measures that will achieve an organization's 
goals, the organization must have an understanding of individual motivation and reward 
systems and how they relate to performance. Expectancy theory is a useful model for 
understanding this relationship. 
This chapter discusses the Expectancy theory of employee motivation through 
performance measures and rewards. It also discusses performance measure-reward 
disconnects within DoD's supply system. Then it applies these concepts to develop 
performance measures that may reduce inventory levels in DoD. 
A. INDIVIDUAL BEHA VIOR!PERFORMANCE: EXPECTANCY THEORY 
Psychologists have conducted a great deal of research over the years to try to 
determine why employees act as they do, and how to get them to behave the way the 
organization wants them to. The originator of the concept of"expectancy," Victor H. 
Vroom, cites the ancient Greek philosophers' principle of"hedonism" as the basis for 
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what has since developed into Expectancy Theory. Hedonism is based upon the 
assumption that: 
... in every situation people select from alternative possibilities the 
course of action which they think will maximize their pleasure and 
minimize their pain (Vroom, 1964; p. 9). 
Over the years, studies such as those done by Porter and Lawler (1968), Dachler and 
Mobley (1973), Lawler (1973), Lawler and Suttle (1973), Locke (1975), Nadler and 
~awler (1977), and Kanfer (1990) have shown Expectancy Theory to be a comprehensive 
theoretical tool for understanding work motivation in organizations (Pinder, 1984). 
Figure 3.1 is a graphic representation of Expectancy Theory showing the three key 
elements of motivation and the connection between motivation and performance. 
Expectancy theory is based upon four assumptions about the causes of behavior in 
organizations. The terminology used in this thesis is from Nadler and Lawler ( 1977). 
Perfonnance- Outcome Expectancy 
Valence 
Effort - Perfonnance Expectancy Resources 
l Ability I 1 I Role Perceptions "-.. / 
Motivation 1---.1 Effort I I Performance I ___. 
1 
t I i l I Judgment I 
Figure 3.1 Expectancy Theory 
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Outcomes 
(Rewards) 
1. Assumptions of Expectancy Theory 
The first assumption of expectancy theory is that behavior is determined by a 
combination of forces in the individual and forces in the environment. Neither the 
individual nor the environment alone determine behavior. People have unique sets of 
needs, ways of looking at the world and expectations about how organizations will treat 
them. The work environment provides pay structures, supervisors, resources and reward 
systems that influence people's behavior. Different environments tend to produce 
different behavior in similar people just as dissimilar people tend to behave differently in 
similar environments. 
The second assumption is that people make choices about their own behavior in 
organizations. Most of the behavior observed in organizations is the result of 
individuals' conscious decisions. Individuals make decisions about coming to work, 
staying at work and how much effort they will put toward performing their jobs while 
they are at work (Nadler and Lawler, 1977). Effort is an individual choice. 
The third assumption is that people have different types of needs, desires and 
goals. Individuals differ on the kinds of outcomes or rewards they desire. One individual 
may be satisfied at his or her current level of responsibility and pay, while another 
individual desires a much greater scope of responsibility and increased pay. If both are 
offered an opportunity for promotion, the first individual may decline while the second 
immediately accepts. Also, a parent may want paid vacation days and increased family 
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health benefits, while a single individual may prefer the cash equivalent in his or her 
paycheck. 
The final assumption is that people make decisions among alternative plans of 
behavior based upon their expectation of the degree to which a given behavior will lead 
to desired outcomes. In other words, "that which gets rewarded, gets done" (Fields, 
1996). 
The basis of expectancy theory is that people are neither innately motivated nor 
unmotivated; they respond (make choices) based upon the situation they are in and how it 
fits their needs. An organization, such as DoD, must accept this and take it into account 
when developing the performance measures and reward systems for its employees. 
2. Employee Motivation 
Based on these assumptions, expectancy theory states a number of propositions 
about motivation and the process by which people make decisions concerning their own 
behavior in organizational settings. Expectancy theory comprises a series of observations 
about behavior. Three key concepts are the basis of motivation according to expectancy 
theory: 
1) Performance - Outcome expectancy; 
2) Valence; and 
3) Effort- Performance expectancy. 
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a. Performance- Outcome Expectancy 
An individual associates every behavior with a set of outcomes. A person 
expects that if he behaves a certain way, there is a probability that certain things will 
occur. These outcomes can be seen as either positive or negative by the individual. 
Performance-Outcome expectancies range from a probability of 0 (seeing no connection 
between performance and an outcome) to a probability of 1 (being certain that the 
outcome will follow the performance). Individuals believe that certain levels of 
performance will lead to approval or disapproval from supervisors or peers. Performance 
- outcome expectancies are reinforced over time as experience is gained each time a 
behavior occurs and receives a response. Each performance can be seen as leading to a 
number of different outcomes. The more often an item manager is rewarded for high 
order fill rates, the stronger the expectation that having a high order fill rate will result in 
a reward. If high order fill rates cease to be rewarded, the performance - outcome 
expectancy will lower over time. 
b. Valence 
Each outcome has a "valence" or anticipated value to a specific 
individual. The same outcome will have different valences to different individuals. This 
occurs because "valences result from individual needs and perceptions which differ 
because they, in turn, reflect other factors in the individual's life" (Nadler and Lawler, 
1977). 
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Valences range in value from -1 (punishing) to 1 (rewarding), with 0 
indicating that an outcome is neither punishing nor rewarding. An example of valence 
differences would include one commander valuing high levels of spare parts inventory to 
maintain a certainty of readiness (e.g. valence of 1), while a different commander does 
not want to invest his or her discretionary budget in this manner (e.g. valence estimated 
at about -.6). 
c. Effort- Performance Expectancy 
In an individual's mind each behavior also is associated with a certain 
expectancy or probability of success. This represents the individual's perception of how 
difficult it will be to achieve a level of performance. For example, an Item Manager 
responsible for several items may be certain that he or she can fill an incoming 
requisition for one item (probability of 1 ), be equally certain that he or she will be unable 
to fill an order for a different item (probability of 0), and be somewhat certain of filling 
an order for a third item (probability of .5) if the order is below a certain size. 
d. Other Factors 
An individual's level of motivation determines the amount of effort he or 
she is willing to expend to perform the job. However, other factors also have an impact 
on this process. Although this thesis does not discuss these factors in depth, they do bear 
mentioning. First, the individual's ability to do what is being asked of him or her is a 
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compilation of natural aptitude, experience and training. If the individual does not have, 
or does not think he or she has, the ability to perform at the desired level work 
performance will suffer. 
The individual's access to necessacy resources such as tools, equipment or 
consumable supplies, affects his or her performance. If the necessacy resources are not 
available, the employee is unable to perform. Inability due to lack of resources is 
different from inability due to lack of aptitude, experience, or training. 
The individual's role perceptions of the roles he or she and his or her 
coworkers play in achieving organizational goals or missions can either help or hinder 
performance. Where roles and the relationships between roles is unclear, performance 
will suffer because the individual does not know what performance criteria are expected 
of him or her, or how the organization benefits from his or her performance. The impact 
of ability, resources and role perceptions on motivation are depicted by a feedback loop 
in Figure 3.1. 
Finally, employee perceptions regarding how a supervisor judges his or 
her performance also affect employee motivation in terms of whether or not the 
performance will be repeated. If an individual believes that his or her performance will 
be judged harshly regardless of his or her effort, the probabilistic values of their 
performance - outcome and effort - performance expectancies will be lower than they 
were initially. 
29 
when: 
e. Summary 
An individual's motivation to perform or act in a certain way is greatest 
1) The individual believes that he or she is able to perform at the desired level 
(Effort - Performance Expectancy); 
2) The individual believes that the behavior will lead to outcomes 
(Performance- Outcome Expectancy); and 
3) The individual believes that these outcomes have positive value for him or her 
(Valence). 
Algebraically, the decision making process resembles this equation (Vroom, 1964; p 27). 
The expectancy value in the equation is the Performance-Outcome expectancy multiplied 
by the Effort-Performance expectancy. 
" (Valence ofJ 
.i-1 outcome J ( 
Expectancy that aj 
X L K will result in 
outcome) 
For all actsK and outcomes) 
Motivation to 
perform act K 
Given alternatives, an individual will choose that level of performance which has 
the greatest motivational force associated with it, as indicated by the person's 
expectations, valences and outcomes (either the strongest positive or the weakest 
negative outcomes). 
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B. FORMAL REWARD SYSTEMS 
From an organizational perspective, expectancy theory suggests that an effective 
organizational design involves an exacting and thorough diagnosis by its managers to 
determine clearly the goals of the organization, to define precisely the roles and desired 
outcomes within the organization, and to identify the relevant forces in the individual and 
the relevant forces in the environment which combine to motivate different kinds of 
b_ehavior (Nadler and Lawler, 1977). Then it is necessary to develop a rewards system 
(e.g., pay, bonuses, promotions, job assignments, etc.) to bring about the desired 
performance behaviors by providing different outcomes for different individuals. 
Figure 3.2 depicts this iterative process. "The premise is that performance is the output; 
if a firm wants performance, it must be able to reward it" (VonGlinow, 1988). This is 
accomplished by tying together performance - outcome expectancies and valences in the 
manner described by the earlier equation. As depicted in Figure 3.2, rewards are to be a 
direct result of performance as measured by the organization. It follows, therefore, that if 
an individual's performance measures do not directly support organizational goals, a 
Definition 
of Goals 
Feedback Feedback 
Figure 3.2 The Performance-Reward Relationship 
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reward system based upon these performance measures will not be effective in bringing 
the organization closer to achieving these goals. This is true for DoD as welL 
Unlike commercial businesses that can design and tailor their reward systems to 
best accomplish their goals, federal employees and supervisors are constrained by law as 
to the rewards that may be given. Each agency of the Executive Branch has its own 
personnel system, however they all operate under the same legal constraints. Until 
recently, monetary rewards for civilian personnel were limited to annual bonuses of no 
greater than two percent of the employee's annual salary. The Army has since done 
away with that cap (Underwood, 1996), but the Navy's policy is a 1.5% maximum 
(Carpenter, 1996). Civilians also may receive "on the spot" cash awards of$25 to $250 
per award for exceptional day-to-day performance. They also may be awarded up to 80 
paid hours off per year in lieu of or in addition to, monetary awards. Special Act awards 
range from $25 to $10,000 per award and are designed as a reward for long term project 
contributions within or outside of work. All civilian awards are paid from the 
command's civilian personnel account, and award approval is affected by mission and 
funding constraints. (Underwood, 1996; Carpenter, 1996) 
For military personnel, the primary means of rewarding significant contributions 
to the command or service is the award of a Letter of Commendation or medaL While 
these do not have any monetary value, they are worth one and two points each, 
respectively, added to promotion score composites However, the composite scores 
required for promotion are so high that these additional points are not a significant 
motivating factor. It is possible for military personnel to receive a monetary reward 
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under the Beneficial Suggestion award program. However, this is a long, drawn out 
process designed to accept ideas that result in large scale changes, ignoring smaller 
improvements. Military personnel also can be granted time off ("specialliberty") within 
certain additional constraints. 
Recognition, in its various forms, is the paramount means for rewarding military 
and civilian employees, yet in the author's experience it is also the least uniformly 
applied. Some commands and departments expend a great deal of time and effort to 
recognize their people. Other units do not, citing lack of time to do the sometimes 
lengthy paperwork required to nominate people for awards. It has also been the author's 
experience that commands that consciously devote the time to recognizing their 
personnel, even in non-monetary ways, have significantly higher morale overall, due in 
large part to the employees' belief that the command values them. 
C. GOAL- PERFORMANCE MEASURE DISCONNECTS 
A goal - performance measure disconnect is a situation where an organization's 
performance measures are not directly linked to or do not support the desired goals of the 
organization. Goal - performance measure disconnects occur primarily when the goal 
(desired outcome) of the organization is not clearly defined, where competing goals 
conflict with each other, where roles within the organization are unclear, where 
performance metrics are not easily quantifiable, or where the relationship between 
performance measures, rewards and outcomes are not clear or visible. Where significant 
ambiguity is present, some individuals are rewarded for performance that does not 
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achieve the organization~s desired outcomes (goals), while other individuals, whose 
performance does contribute to desired outcomes are not rewarded at all. 
As DoD struggles to define its role in the future, it also is attempting to determine 
how best to become more efficient while remaining effective at what it currently does 
(Cusick, 1996)~ a situation fraught with ambiguity. In the meantime, performance 
measures for Item and Inventory Managers have remained the same, continuing the focus 
on readiness. This situation results in a disconnect between the organization's goal of 
effective secondary material supply and efficient inventory practices, and the individual 
performance measures being used. 
As an example, the Item and Inventory Managers' primary performance measures 
are order fill rates and backorder age (Chapter II). The manager's performance-
outcome expectancy is high (probability of .8 or higher) that if order fill rates are high 
and backorder age is low that he or she will do well on performance appraisals, continue 
to be employed and possibly receive a bonus and recommendation for promotion (Nixon 
and Wolfe, 1996; Brownfield and Santy,1996; Park, 1996). Holding lower inventory 
levels may result in a lower performance - outcome expectancy since the manager is not 
rated on the amount of inventory being held. Research indicated that holding high levels 
of inventory has a high valence value to managers (value near 1 ), since order fill rate is a 
performance measure. Holding less inventory while meeting demand has a valence near 
0, because it does not affect the manager either positively or negatively. However, 
lowering the amount of inventory held, and then being unable to fill a requisition has a 
valence value near -1 (punishing) because this lowers order fill rates and results in poor 
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marks on the manager's performance appraisal. Therefore, Inventory Managers are 
motivated to maintain high inventory levels so that the manager feels certain (probability 
value near 1) that he or she will be able to fill a requisition for every item managed when 
a requisition arrives. Once this relationship is understood, DoD can develop performance 
measures tied directly to available rewards. 
D. PERFORMANCE MEASURES THAT MAY RESULT IN LOWER 
INVENTORY LEVELS 
This section discusses three performance measures that, when included as part of 
the performance appraisals of persons within and using the DoD supply system, would 
promote lower inventory levels. 
1. Inventory Turnover 
Inventory Turnover is a quantifiable measure obtained by dividing the cost of 
goods sold (or issued), by the average inventory on hand of each item during the period. 
The goal of the manager is to achieve as large an aggregate Inventory Turnover value as 
possible. 
The calculation is straightforward and simple. The information is easiest to obtain 
for small accounts (unit level) and facilities with high levels of automation providing 
total asset visibility to Item and Inventory Managers. Direct vendor deliveries (DVD) are 
included in the cost of goods sold, but add no value to average inventory as the material 
was not handled or held by DoD. This provides managers an incentive for DVD use. It 
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is also a cost saving measure for DoD. Those items that can be purchased only in bulk 
from the manufacturer are evaluated separately, as this is outside the manager's control. 
An example of this type of item is military aircraft tires, which are manufactured in a 
single production run each year, so the year's demand must be purchased at once. "Life-
of-Type" purchases of spare parts for new weapons systems also come under this 
provision. 
This performance measure is in addition to current measures and should be 
weighted equally with order fill rates to obtain the optimal balance between efficiency 
and effectiveness. Equal weighting would prevent the Order Fill Rate measure from 
promoting high ''just-in-case" inventory levels, while at the same time preventing the 
Inventory Turnover measure from promoting inventory reduction to levels which would 
cause critical shortages and impair readiness. Threshold levels for each performance 
measure should be set appropriate to the item's criticality to combat effectiveness. 
2. Total Costing 
Total Costing places responsibility on Item and Inventory Managers to manage 
the overall cost of providing an item to the user. The most commonly used method for 
accomplishing this is the economic order quantity (EOQ) model (Figure 3.3). This 
model incorporates item procurement or ordering costs, along with the cost of holding 
and managing the item. Its purpose is to determine the optimal number of items to order 
at a time and the number of times to order per period to meet demand for the lowest total 
cost. 
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Q*= ~ 
'.] =pc-= 
Q* = Optimal Ordering Quantity 
D = Annual Demand S = Order Cost 
I = Carrying Cost as a % of Inventory 
Value 
C =Item Value 
Total Cost= Annual Ordering Costs+ Holding Cost of Average Regular Inventory+ 
Holding Cost of Safety Stock 
Figure 3.3 Basic Economic Order Quantity and Total Cost Models 
While every branch of service uses variations of the basic EOQ model shown in 
Figure 3.3, research indicates that the ordering and holding cost values are "educated 
estimates" and "best approximations" due to the inability of the current federal 
accounting system to support accurate direct cost assignment and indirect cost allocations 
(Park, 1996; Morefield and Moore, 1996). One drawback of the EOQ model in Figure 
3.3 is that it assumes that no stockouts occur. Accurate Total Costing requires that 
stockout costs be included; however, stockout costs are even harder to quantify than 
holding costs. If the cost of a stockout is not quantified, an Item or Inventory Manager is 
likely to assume that the cost is infinitely large to the organization (lost lives, lost wars) 
and to themselves personally (low order fill rates and high backorder ages). As a result, 
the manager will carry large inventories. 
Total Costing requires an accounting system that assists activities to accurately 
track direct and assignable costs, and to allocate indirect and common costs to the 
activities in which they engage. The ability to do so would enable Item and Inventory 
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Managers to manage their inventories better by balancing the costs of procuring, holding 
and transporting materials to the customer. 
Total Costing encourages Item and Inventory Managers to investigate ways to 
increase the cost effectiveness of their operation. Any improvement (reduction) in the 
total cost incurred is a positive element on performance appraisals. Item or Inventory 
Managers could be recommended for a bonus for achieving certain cost reductions (i.e. 
5% or 10% overall) while keeping customer support at or above previously set 
thresholds. 
Adding Inventory Turnover and Total Costing criteria to performance appraisals 
would link them to the performance - outcome expectancy that is established for current 
criteria, adding efficiency to the performance requirements for achieving the desired 
reward (continued employment, bonus, consideration for promotion). This would result 
in a positive valence for Inventory Turnover and Total Costing behaviors as well. 
3. Separate Readiness Criteria 
Unlike Inventory Turnover and Total Costing, this criterion is not quantifiable. A 
clearer separation of accountability for readiness levels would be beneficial to unit 
commanders. This factor is designed to separate lower readiness levels due to poor 
management, which should reflect on the commander, from lower readiness levels due to 
item non-availability from the supply system, something over which unit commanders 
have no control. Although this separation may be intuitive, in practice unit commanders 
are held to stringent readiness requirements regardless of the reason for low readiness. 
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Even when superiors attempt this separation, a unit commander's peers may 
inadvertently exacerbate the situation simply by briefing their troops about a short notice 
deployment due to the other unit's lack of readiness. Disgruntled troops tend to translate 
this situation into a lack of leadership, regardless of whether it is a leadership or a 
material problem. This can damage the reputation and professional standing of the unit 
commander. 
It is likely that a philosophical shift at all levels of DoD must occur for an 
effective separation to be established between these two reasons for readiness 
deficiencies. Poor management, lack of planning and weak leadership are important 
issues that need to be reflected on users' performance appraisals, but material 
deficiencies due to the supply system's inability to provide needed items should reflect 
only on those responsible for the provision of these items. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the relationship between individual employee motivation 
and performance measures that accurately reflect the organizations goals. It also has 
suggested the addition of three additional performance measures which, when used in 
conjunction with those already in use, should increase the likelihood oflnventory and 
Item Managers reducing the amount of inventory held in DoD and other federal storage 
facilities. In addition, this chapter discussed the limited rewards available to government 
employees, military and civilian alike. 
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There are other forces internal and external to DoD which indirectly, but 
significantly, affect inventory levels in DoD. These forces must be recognized and 
addressed as well, if efficient and effective inventory management is to become 
commonplace. These forces are the subject of the next chapter. 
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IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO CHANGE 
Effective use of the additional performance measures of Inventory Turnover and 
Total Costing requires changes to the current system. This chapter discusses some of the 
issues and factors that impede the change process. Some of these factors are internal to 
DoD, and others are external to DoD. 
A. INTERNAL TO DOD 
Factors internal to DoD are those issues that DoD has some control over and has 
the authority to change. There are seven significant factors internal to DoD that impact 
inventory management capability. 
1. Definition of "Excess" 
One impediment to change is the lack of a single definition of"excess" inventory. 
A heated debate is ongoing, fueled by GAO reports citing that DoD has excess 
inventory levels. While conducting research for this thesis, the author learned that DoD 
does not have a set definition of"excess." LTGEN Cusick, Office of the Joint Chiefs 
(J4), commented that "excess is in the eyes of the beholder." He indicated that DoD is 
focusing on doing the "smart" thing, rather than simply rushing into doing something 
quickly (Cusick, 1996). Mr. De Haven, Deputy Chief of Staff- Combat Development for 
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the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command states that "what is fat for one is muscle 
for another" (DeHaven, 1996). 
Despite not having a clear definition of"excess," the primary reasons for current 
"excess" inventory levels are: 
1) Base realignment and closures: Disbanded units' RO material is transferred 
and held at other installations, which results in those installations holding 
inventory levels over and above their RO level ("excess"). 
2) Weapons System Modifications: When a service purchases a weapon system, 
it often purchases the number of spare parts it expects it will need over the 
expected life of the weapons system. As the system is modified, the spare 
parts become obsolete and thus become excess inventory. 
3) Support of Allies: DoD retains some older versions of weapons systems and 
the associated repair parts needed to support foreign military sales and 
treaties. These inventories are "excess" in terms of U.S. military needs. 
2. Technology 
A second impediment to change is the lack of an information system integrated 
throughout DoD and the service branches. While conducting research for this thesis, the 
concern most often voiced by Item Managers, Inventory Managers and users is the lack 
of an integrated information system that can provide total asset visibility (T A V). The 
services have only recently begun fielding this capability service-wide. The Air Force is 
the farthest along in the process. Without such capabilities Item and Inventory Managers 
work with incomplete data collected during physical inventorying. 
Technology that supports TAV requires a large financial investment to develop 
and implement. It also requires that the supply and logistics elements within DoD arrive 
at a consensus about the format to be used. DLA and the service branches are in the early 
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stages of developing the software to allow DLA' s inventory information system to 
interface with the service branches' systems (Oakley, 1996). This is a huge undertaking 
requiring time, a significant level of cooperation throughout DoD and ongoing financial 
support. The services disagree on what the system should look like, do, and what 
information elements are important. The ultimate goal is to have T A V at the DoD level 
as well as at the individual service level. 
3. The Accounting System 
A third impediment to change is the lack of an accounting system that is flexible 
enough to provide useful cost data to management. Government agencies receive their 
funding from a variety of congressional appropriations that can include hundreds of 
stipulations about where, by what process, and how much money can or must be spent 
and on what. Over the years, these Congressional directions have caused large and 
highly complex accounting systems to develop, which are designed to track and control 
agency compliance in each area covered by these stipulations. The accounting systems in 
use in the federal government are very fragmented. Accounting codes used by the system 
are designed ultimately to link expenditures with the original funding authorization 
account to preclude over spending. 
These codes are almost impossible for an untrained person to understand (e.g., the 
first line of accounting data in a change of duty orders consists of about 52 characters and 
spaces). Further, it is very difficult for an accounting department to identify and 
aggregate direct, indirect and allocated costs in a meaningful way to allow a command of 
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any size to know how much it costs to perform a particular aspect of the unit's mission. 
For example, the pay, benefits and monetary awards for civilian personnel are part of a 
unit's budget, but the same cost elements for military personnel are not. Until unit 
commanders have accurate, complete cost information they will have limited success 
controlling those costs. 
4. Focus on Immediate Results 
A fourth impediment to change is the brief period of time that military personnel 
spend in a given job or position. Throughout DoD, at every level, from the most junior to 
the most senior positions, an individuals' performance is measured by what was 
accomplished during his or her tenure in a particular job or position. These performance 
appraisals support or undermine the possibility of the incumbent receiving future 
positions of increased responsibility and prestige. Therefore, there is a tendency to focus 
on short-term projects that begin to pay off prior to the transfer of the initiator. Long-
term projects with more lasting benefits can be ignored if initial investments required are 
high and the credit will go to a successor. 
5. Distrust of the Supply System 
A fifth impediment is ongoing distrust in the reliability of the supply system, 
resulting in stockpiling and over-prioritizing of requests for secondary items. The image 
of an unreliable supply and logistics system is so ingrained in the folklore of the military 
44 
service, that it could take a generation or more of flawless customer service to soften the 
stigma. However, the availability of secondary items is crucial to the readiness of 
combat and logistics support units. This distrust and the fact that a stockout can cost 
lives result in users occasionally placing a higher priority code on a requisition than the 
item warrants, hoping that it will result in faster receipt of the item. This practice can 
hide poor inventory management at the user level and may result in another unit's 
readiness being degraded due to its inability to obtain the same item. 
6. Training 
A sixth impediment internal to DoD is the lack of uniformity of the training of 
supply personnel. One GAO Report identified a lack of uniform and regular training in 
modem logistics practices as a significant cause of excess inventory in DoD. It proposed 
that Item and Inventory Managers are not as effective as they could be due to lack of 
training in modem inventory management practices. The service branches all use initial 
training courses for their military officer and enlisted supply personnel, and each 
service's training programs focus on its individual supply system regulations and 
procedures. (GAO/NSIAD 94-193; p. 4). 
Research shows that a great deal of training is available to military and civilian 
personnel in the DoD's supply systems, and all the Item and Inventory Managers 
interviewed had received training in subjects such as EOQ models, Just-in-Time 
Inventory, and TAV. They also reported that these modem methods are being used in 
DoD, and that they actively attempt to identify additional areas in which to implement 
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these practices. The expanding role ofDVD is one example of modem inventory method 
implementation. (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996; Park, 1996; Brownfield and Santy, 1996; 
Benson, 1996; Tully and Bellinger, 1996).They did acknowledge, however, that access to 
training opportunities can be haphazard for many junior-level civilian employees due to 
low manning levels and funding for training. Therefore, the training of civilian supply 
clerks more often involves informal on-the-job training than formal classroom 
instruction. 
7. Readiness Concerns 
An additional factor affecting inventory management is the concern that readiness 
not be compromised. The unresolved question of the future role of the military has a side 
effect of slowing significant change to the supply system pending a set direction for DoD 
as a whole. From a readiness standpoint, "no one knows exactly where we are and where 
we want to end up" (Cusick, 1996). The philosophy of the current military supply 
system is predicated on high levels of combat readiness. It is unlikely this focus will 
change. As such, DoD is wary about setting or changing policies while it wrestles with 
this issue. Meanwhile, the supply system is constrained regarding how best to determine 
what to stock, how much to stock and the strategic placement of that stock. 
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B. EXTERNAL TO DOD 
Factors external to DoD are those issues that DoD does not have control over and 
lacks the authority to change or adapt to DoD's needs. There are two primary factors 
external to DoD which impact its inventory management capability. 
1. Funding 
The U.S. Constitution gave Congress "the power of the purse" stating that no 
federal funds will be disbursed without Congressional approval. This provision is the 
basis of the annual budgeting process. Federal funding of executive branch agencies 
typically comprises thirteen appropriations bills, of which the DoD authorization is one. 
Once the appropriation is passed, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
apportions the authorized funds on a roughly quarterly basis. 
The method by which DoD receives its funding is a significant impediment to 
long term improvements and upgrades to the equipment and methods used to manage 
inventories within DoD. The annual Congressional appropriation and OMB 
apportionment process results in a significant amount of financial uncertainty from year 
to year within federal agencies. Ongoing budget reductions, the changing role of the U.S. 
military in world affairs and the need to respond to "hot spots" around the world at a 
moment's notice make it difficult for DoD to depend upon its ability to fund and 
implement long-term cost-saving and efficiency-improving measures which require large 
investments of resources up front. 
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2. Focus on Immediate Results 
The military has been criticized from time to time about the short duration its 
leaders spend in important policy-making jobs, typically two to three years in any one 
position. The concern, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is that this promotes a short-
term "quick fix" focus rather than a long term benefit focus. 
Much like those in DoD, Congress and Executive branch appointees also are 
j'qdged by what took place while they were in office. These judgments made by the 
American public either support or counter the incumbent's chances of being re-elected or 
re-appointed to future positions of increased responsibility and prestige. U.S. Senators 
serve a term of six years, while those in the House of Representatives serve only two 
years between elections. Cabinet appointees typically serve about four years (the span of 
a presidential term), although some serve under more than one presidential 
administration. This lends itself to a near-sighted focus, and consequently he or she has a 
tendency to focus on short-term projects that will pay off during his or her term in office. 
Long-term projects with benefits lasting more than one election cycle may be ignored if 
the initial investment of time and/or money is high, the benefits would accrue to a district 
other than the initiator's, or the credit can go to someone other than the initiator. 
Congress could change the frequency of the budgeting process, but decreasing the 
frequency decreases the impact that some members of Congress can influence over the 
budget, which in turn limits their ability to provide for their districts and thus their 
chances for re-election. 
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C. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed several issues that impact and limit the ability of DoD to 
change. DoD is attempting to develop a useful, accurate definition of "excess 
inventory," and is slowly making progress toward TAV through integrated information 
technology. However, these changes are costly and, due to the nature of the organization, 
also are very time intensive, requiring the cooperation of all the branches of service and 
DLA. 
The issues discussed that are outside DoD's control will not change. 
Congressional control over the budget and the budgeting process were designed in by the 
authors of the Constitution, as were the lengths of Congress-members' terms in office. 
One Congress may reach consensus in support of DoD's efforts, but the next election can 
alter the membership of Congress, changing the level of political and financial support 
DoD receives. 
This thesis acknowledges the impact of such occurrences, as well as the fact that 
some of the issues and factors that impede change in DoD have been designed to do just 
that. How then does DoD implement the performance measures discussed in Chapter ill, 
given the impediments discussed in this chapter? This question is answered in the next 
chapter. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES AND REWARDS 
The performance measures discussed earlier can be implemented, but it may be 
costly. In order for the performance measures to be most effective, the impediments 
identified in the previous chapter must be taken into account, and DoD must address and 
resolve to the greatest extent possible those issues that it can control or modify. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF INVENTORY TURNOVER 
Implementation of Inventory Turnover as a performance measure requires, as a 
minimum, an accurate accounting of inventory on hand as of the date of implementation. 
At the unit level a 100% physical inventory count, reconciled with an automated 
inventory information system, is preferred wherever possible. This data will be the 
beginning inventory figure for the calculation. Also, a minimum of two years of accurate 
demand data should be compiled and evaluated for trends and cycles prior to setting a 
criterion standard for employee success. Inventory and Item Managers should complete 
training on data collection and Inventory Turnover computation at least three months 
prior to the commencement of Inventory Turnover criterion use. 
The people to be evaluated and their supervisors should be involved in the initial 
data collection process, and the completion of the 100% inventory should be timed to 
coincide with the start of the next performance appraisal cycle. Employee involvement 
lends credibility to the beginning inventory figure, while adding a check for the person 
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assisting in the data collection, as well as a potential increase in the valence of this 
activity to the employee. The timing allows the employee to be evaluated against the 
new performance criterion for the entire appraisal cycle, limiting confusion about what 
the individual is expected to do and when. 
As inventory information systems within and between the services and DLA are 
integrated, this performance measure should be added to the performance criteria of the 
individual overseeing that level of the supply process. A typical step implementation 
process would be: 
1) Unit/Platoon/Squadron level, 
2) Brigade/Wing level, 
3) Base/Division/Group level, 
4) Area level, 
5) Region level, 
6) Service level, and 
7) Full integration between services and DLA. 
Steps 1 through 3 refer primarily to retail level supply activities, and steps 4 through 6 
typically incorporate wholesale level activities. Seamless integration of inventory 
management technology requires ongoing and reliable funding levels to complete. As 
each successive level of integration occurs, the ability of the supply system to respond to 
readiness issues can be expected to increase. 
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The time needed for the implementation of Inventory Turnover as a performance 
measure will depend on the level of automation and T A V system integration available at 
a particular site. It is expected that those areas that have TA V information systems in 
place will be able to implement Inventory Turnover faster than those areas that are still 
awaiting that capability. Based on the level of automation available and the rate of 
fielding additional TA V capabilities by the service branches, the author expects that the 
majority of units will be able to implement Inventory Turnover within the next three to 
five years. It may take longer for service branch systems to be fully integrated with 
DLA's system. This long range time-frame can be expected to conflict with the ongoing 
focus on immediate results, requiring that actions toward this end be rewarded by the 
chain of command in order for them to continue to occur. The impediment areas of 
"excess" definition, the structure of the accounting system and distrust in the supply 
system do not have a significant impact on the implementation of the Inventory Turnover 
performance measure. 
B. IM:PLEMENTATION OF TOTAL COSTING 
Implementing Total Costing as a performance measure requires Item and 
Inventory Managers to have access to accurate cost breakdowns of what each element of 
mission achievement actually costs, including stockout costs. Total Costing requires that 
direct and indirect costs be identifiable and traceable to the unit element incurring those 
costs. It requires that the salaries and benefits of military personnel be included in these 
costs. Since military personnel costs are a direct Congressional appropriation, they are 
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not a budget element for individual commands and as such are largely-ignored, while 
civilian pay accounts are monitored closely because this account is a budget element for 
each unit. 
Total Costing also requires that the general and administrative costs and overhead 
costs be accurately computed and assignable to the mission specific elements of the unit. 
General and administrative costs include the salaries and benefits of the Commanding 
Officer, Executive Officer and the unit's administrative staff, as well as the consumables, 
office equipment and cost per square foot of the space they occupy (leased offices and 
facilities). Overhead costs include utilities, cleaning contracts, groundskeeping, etc. 
The current accounting system used by DoD does not allow for this degree of 
accuracy in cost accounting. This system is designed to track expenditures by 
appropriation category to preclude over-spending (or under-spending in some cases) the 
Congressionally appropriated amount. Defense Business Operating Fund activities are 
using total cost concepts in their operations, however, due to the accounting system used 
in DoD, the surcharge added to the cost of the item purchased is based on a best estimate 
of the cost, true costs are unknown (Park, 1996; Morefield and Moore, 1996). 
In order for Total Costing to be effective, the accounting system and software 
technology used by DoD must be modified or changed to allow comptrollers to 
accurately track the real cost of doing business. However, once costs can be accurately 
tracked, unit personnel can better utilize the total cost concept described earlier. 
Training in accurate data collection and the use of Total Costing should be accomplished 
about six months prior to the incorporation of this criterion into performance evaluations 
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in order to maximize the effort-performance expectancy of the individual. 
Implementation should begin at the start of the new performance appraisal cycle. This 
criterion need not be limited to Item and Inventory Managers, but is applicable to anyone 
in the organization who incurs costs. 
In many cases the Total Costing tools are already in place. The implementation 
of the Total Costing criteria depends on funding the necessary software changes, focusing 
on long-term gains instead of short-term results and compiling accurate data on which to 
use these tools. The impediments of the definition of"excess," distrust of the supply 
system and readiness concerns do not impact the implementation of Total Costing as a 
performance measure 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATE READINESS CRITERIA 
Separate readiness criteria implementation should be designed to assist unit 
commanders in managing inventory more effectively. This may involve a shift in attitude 
throughout the chain of command and will require training in performance criteria 
design. The author suggests that readiness degradation caused, by either the lack of 
repair and spare parts in the supply system or the system's inability to respond in a timely 
manner, be addressed separately from readiness degradation caused by poor inventory 
management or lack of planning. The repercussions to unit commanders from these two 
very different causes of lowered readiness tend currently to be the same. This 
performance-outcome expectancy on the part of the unit commander along with a distrust 
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in the supply system's ability to provide materials can result in carrying additional 
inventory which may be labeled "excess." 
Poor management and lack of planning do and should reflect on the unit 
commander's performance appraisal. However, if the systemic problem of lack of 
inventory availability is addressed separately from the unit commander's management 
ability, significant positive outcomes can be expected. Initially, the commander will 
have less fear that his or her career is in jeopardy. This, in tum can significantly reduce 
the number of requisitions placed in the supply system with artificially high priority 
codes. A reduction in the number of high priority orders allows the supply system to 
concentrate on filling requisitions for units whose need of those parts is critical. This 
reduces the level of chaos for Item and Inventory Managers, providing a more stable 
environment in which to plan. When units receive critical items when needed, trust in 
the system increases, reducing the amount of inventory ordered above demand 
requirements. In turn, the amount of inventory held at all levels of the system is 
decreased, a highly desired outcome for DoD. 
This process is a beneficial repeating cycle, and will require a lengthy period of 
time to pay off but, when coupled with the other performance measures discussed, is an 
excellent way of creating and supporting an organizational culture which rewards 
efficient and effective inventory management and a focus on long term results. The 
impediment areas of technology and the accounting system have minimal impact on the 
implementation of separate read!ness criteria. A standard definition of "excess" would 
be helpful but is not necessary for implementation. 
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D. REWARD SYSTEM CHANGES 
A significant issue of the federal reward structure is the variability found in how it 
is administered, both between and within DLA and the service branches. Each DoD 
component has its own view of what constitutes an effective reward system and what 
administrative constraints to place upon supervisors. How the reward system is used 
varies widely between commands within each service as well, with some commands 
f<.mnally rewarding as many of its employees as possible and other commands rewarding 
very few of its personnel, weakening the performance-outcome expectancy for many 
military and civilian employees. 
The service branches should remove any constraints they have imposed that is in 
addition to DoD guidance. Uniform guidelines for each level of award, military and 
civilian, need to be developed and published. Extensive and consistent training of 
military and civilian supervisors in all DoD departments is needed on the purpose, intent 
and administration of DoD's reward structure. This training would address military and 
civilian awards and should be conducted at military installations by mobile training 
teams comprised ofDoD staff or a joint service instructional team. The result of these 
activities is to increase the equity in administration of awards for military and civilian 
employees. 
The military reward system is fairly straightforward in design, but easily 
influenced by the personal preferences of each individual commander. The training 
should be focused on reducing the number of award level variances between commands 
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as well as between the services. Military personnel are eligible for few monetary awards, 
so recognition awards become even more critical to their level of motivation 
(Performance-Outcome expectancy). 
Civilians are eligible for several levels of monetary awards, and the criteria for 
awarding each of these is fairly well defined. The critical element to the civilian reward 
system is the need to link individual performance measures with rewards and reward 
those who deserve it. The Navy's system has a set minimum award for those who are 
rated overall as "succeeding" in their job. This requirement causes difficulty when 
attempting to recognize a stellar employee from a limited civilian award budget. 
Training in this area should address writing performance criteria elements, what the 
options are for supervisors who wish to reward a civilian employee, and ways of 
determining appropriate levels of award compensation. 
Implementing these changes in the current service reward systems may require a 
great deal of persuasion to convince all the service branches that this is the right thing to 
do. This course of action can be expected to be lengthy. Once a consensus is reached, 
however, the implementation of the training aspect of this change also will take a great 
deal of time to develop and to complete the initial outreach. The start-up costs of 
conducting the training will be high, but will decrease somewhat after the initial training 
circuit of installations is complete. 
58 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the implementation of Inventory Turnover and Total 
Costing performance measures, the separation of readiness measures from supply issues, 
and changes to the DoD reward system. The implementation of each of these changes 
will take time and require an ongoing commitment of resources for multiple years. 
These changes can result in lowered inventory through: 
1) Adding the requirement for efficiency to the need for effectiveness from the 
supply system; 
2) Making significant changes to an accounting system which does not provide 
the information necessary for cost-efficient management of inventory; 
3) Relieving some of the pressure unit commanders operate under in an area that 
impacts the ability of the supply system to operate efficiently; and 
4) Expanding supervisory ability to reward good performance, creating a closer 
link between performance measures and outcomes for inventory and item 
managers. 
These changes will not be fast, and they will be expensive up front. However, if these 
changes are made, they can provide long-term benefits which will improve tremendously 
the effectiveness and efficiency of inventory management in DoD. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of this thesis was to identify and recommend those changes needed in 
the current incentive and reward structure necessary for developing and supporting 
efficient and effective inventory management within DoD. First, the current DoD supply 
structure was discussed. The supply system is structured to provide the highest readiness 
levels possible for combatants and their support elements. Ongoing scrutiny has 
indicated that DoD's inventory management can be much more efficient. Current 
performance measures being used in the supply system center around order fill rates and 
backorder age. These performance measures affect inventory practices by promoting 
high on-hand inventory levels. 
Next, a model for individual motivation was developed, and its relationship to 
performance studied. Organizational performance results from the performance of the 
individuals in the organization. Individual motivation is a function of the individual's 
expectancy that he or she is capable of performing at the desired level and the expectancy 
that an outcome will follow an action coupled with the valence of that outcome. It then 
tied this motivation to performance measures and rewards, and it described the formal 
performance rewards available in the federal system. Additional performance measures 
of Inventory Turnover, Total Costing and Separate Readiness Criteria were suggested as 
means to motivate Item and Inventory Managers and users to lower on-hand inventory 
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levels by linking these additional performance measures to formal rewards available to 
employees. 
The impediments to change were then reviewed. Issues internal to DoD including 
the lack of a single definition of"excess," lack of sufficient information system 
automation, an accounting system that does not provide useful cost data, distrust in the 
supply system, a focus on short-term results, readiness concerns and training were 
addressed. The issues external to DoD of funding and a focus on short-term results were 
acknowledged as well. 
Finally, implementation needs for the proposed performance measures were 
developed, given the impediments present, in order for the supply system to manage 
DoD's inventory more efficiently and effectively. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Inventory reduction in DoD can be accomplished. It will not, however, be quick 
and easy. First, it is necessary that Inventory and Item Managers' performance be 
measured with criteria that support inventory reduction. This thesis suggests the addition 
of Inventory Turnover and Total Costing as quantifiable performance measures, and the 
separation of readiness criteria as a non-quantifiable measure. Implementation of these 
performance measures can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the inventory 
management system by reducing a manager's likelihood of being rewarded for carrying 
high levels of inventory. 
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Second, changes are necessary in the way DoD conducts business in other areas, 
as well as within the supply chain itself. DoD supply system personnel are highly skilled 
at meeting and exceeding the performance criteria by which they are graded. If DoD 
desires that Item and Inventory Managers and users behave differently, DoD must 
formally identify and reward the desired behaviors, or they will not occur. The 
incorporation of the additional performance measures discussed links the desired 
behaviors to the employee reward system. DoD needs to educate its members and 
-
support the actions necessary to improve the equity of application of the DoD reward 
system across all levels of the organization. 
Finally, DoD needs to take additional steps for the inventory management system, 
as well as these performance measures, to be most effective and efficient. These 
additional steps are: 
1) Continue information system technology fielding and integration in support 
of TA V. Once TA V capability is in place DoD can take steps to reduce 
redundancies within and between its components with the confidence that 
required stock levels are being maintained; 
2) Modify the accounting system to support the identification and aggregation 
of cost data to enable unit commanders to better manage costs. Until DoD 
has an accounting system that can easily and accurately assess its actual 
costs, it will continue to have limited success managing them; 
3) Define "excess." A standard definition of excess is required if excess 
inventory is to be eradicated throughout DoD; and finally, 
4) Define the future role of the U.S. military. Without a clearer purpose or 
direction, DoD will be unable to determine the changes needed that will 
move it in the direction it wishes to go. 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis focused on performance measures, their impact on DoD inventory 
levels, and reward systems. It also acknowledged the impact of other factors on inventory 
levels. Areas of further research suggested by this research are: devising a DoD standard 
definition of"excess," developing an accounting system modification model to improve 
the usefulness of DoD's accounting system, and developing a curriculum and an 
itp.plementation plan for DoD reward system training with the purpose of decreasing 
variations in the reward system's application. 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS-
1) What is the organization's definition of efficient and effective inventory 
management? 
2) How are these concepts passed on to inventory managers? 
3) What inventory management activities or behaviors are encouraged? Discouraged? 
4) What benefit(s) are received by an inventory manager who takes a calculated risk and 
is successful (no stockout occurs)? 
5) What is the response when an individual's calculated risk is unsuccessful (a stockout 
occurs)? 
6) Are there any behaviors that the (service) says they want but do not reward? 
7) Are there any behaviors that the (service) says they do not want but do not penalize? 
8) In your opinion, what would aid the (service branch)'s ability to reduce its inventory 
of secondary items? 
9) In your opinion, what is an impediment to reductions in inventory? 
The questions asked of the Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics) and his staff 
were more general in nature, relating to strategic and mission /readiness policies and 
issues. 
69 
70 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. Copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Professor Paul J. Fields 1 
Systems Management Department (Code SM/Fp) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
4. Professor Erik Jansen 1 
Systems Management Department (Code SM/Ek) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
5. LT Elysheva S. Martin 2 
910 New Mill Drive 
Chesapeake, VA 23320 
71 
